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Abstract 
Shadow banking entities have been repeatedly charged with the breaking up of the recent financial 
crises. This paper examines the contribution of the money market funds, an important part of the 
shadow banking entities, to the systemic risk in United Kingdom by using the CoVaR methodology 
(Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016). Using a sample of 143 money market funds, continuously listed 
between 2005Q4 and 2013Q4, we investigate the impact of institutional corporate variables on the 
systemic risk. Our results show that liquidity mismatch increases the average systemic risk over the 
whole period, but decreases the risk during the Great Financial Depression. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial literature has recently devoted an increasing attention to the issue of shadow banking, 
exploring institutional features in the United States (Poszar et al. 2012, Adrian and Ashcraft 2016), 
United Kingdom (Jackson 2013), and the Euro area (Bakk-Simon et al. 2012).  
In particular, the supposed involvement in the triggering of the recent financial crisis2 has been 
investigated by considering the relationships between shadow banking and the traditional banking 
system during the financial crisis (Hsu and Moroz 2010, Meeks, et al. 2014). The main differences 
between the two lie in the distinction between relationship based lending versus actuarially based 
lending (Hancock and Passmore 2015) and the nature of core liabilities in the traditional banking 
system versus the noncore liabilities in the shadow banking system (Harutyunyan et al. 2015). 
Despite the significant bulk of research dedicated to this issue, many distinguishing features of the 
shadow banking activities are still unexplored, and an empirical assessment of their contribution to 
systemic risk is yet to come.  
In particular, Money Market Funds (MMFs henceforth), ascribed by financial literature as a part 
of the external and independent shadow banking entities, according to the definition introduced by 
Poszar (2008), Poszar et al. (2012) and Adrian and Ashcraft (2016), and representing a significant 
part of the listed shadow banking entities, have been often criticized for having contributed to 
spread systemic risk. Kodres (2015) notices that during the crisis we observed runs - not the usual 
retail runs but wholesale funding runs - on MMFs that had provided funding to commercial and 
universal banks (both in United States and in Europe).  
MMFs are collective investment schemes which invest in “money market” instruments, with a 
very negligible risk, such as short-term high credit quality and liquid debt instruments, government 
securities, commercial paper, certificates of deposit and short-term securities or provide repurchase 
agreement (repo) financing. The returns to investors in the mutual fund are a straightforward 
function of the gain and losses of the mutual fund’s investment portfolio. Money market mutual 
funds are a sort of “open end” funds in which investors get back their funds redeeming their shares3.  
The main aim of this paper is to identify the main determinants of MMFs contribution to 
systemic risk. There are several reasons of why focusing on MMFs is of interest. On the one hand, 
these shadow entities are directly involved in a revised form of risk and maturities transformation, 
                                                          
2 According to The Economist’(10/5/2014, p. 9), Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and head of the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB), identifies the shadow banking in emerging markets as “the greatest danger to the world  
economy”. 
3 The value of a share in a mutual fund can be identified in the “Net Asset Value” of the fund. The Net Asset Value of a 
mutual fund is the net value of all of its assets divided by the number of shares outstanding. Thus the NAV 
approximates the liquidation value of an investor’s shares in a fund. It is the price at which investors can buy fund 
shares or sell them back to the fund. The fund managers calculates the NAV of the fund each day, and when an investor 
wants his money back, the fund buys (or redeems) the investor’s shares at the price per share (Macey, 2011). 
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and are therefore likely to be identified as financial devices potentially increasing systemic risk of 
the financial sectors. On the other hand, they are typically seen as entities with very negligible risk, 
because their assets are not characterized by maturity mismatch. Therefore, following the arguments 
in previous literature (Macey 2011; Kodres 2015), in this paper we investigate whether the liquidity 
mismatch characterizing these entities lead to a positive or negative contribution to systemic risk, 
discriminating what we can observe during ordinary periods or during financial crises.  
To this purpose, in this paper we adopt the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) measure 
introduced by Adrian and Brunnermaier (2016). The CoVaR quantifies the contribution of a 
financial institution to systemic risk and its contribution to the risk of other financial institutions. 
CoVaR indicates the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of financial institution i, conditional on financial 
institution j being in distress. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) argue that this is a more complete 
measure of risk since it is able to capture alternative sources of risk which affect institution i even 
though they are not generated by it. Furthermore, if we consider that institution i is the whole 
financial system, then ΔCoVaR is defined as the difference between the CoVaR and the 
unconditional VaR and it captures the marginal non-causal contribution of a particular institution to 
the overall systemic risk. 
In this paper, we build on the CoVaR methodology, which allows us to generate time-varying 
estimates of the systemic risk contribution of MMFs as a specific sector of the financial industry. 
We employ micro data from 143 MMF listed on the London Stock Exchange from 2005Q4 to 
2013Q4 While our time span allows us to cover the different phases of the recent financial crises, 
namely the Subprime crisis and the Great Financial Depression, the United Kingdom’s context is 
chosen because it represents one of the most developed shadow banking system among the 
European countries with a relevant presence of listed money market funds.  
To anticipate some findings, our empirical applications allow us to identify what institutional 
features of shadow entities are correlated to systemic risk. As a contribution to previous literature, 
we find that liquidity mismatch plays a major role as determinant of ΔCoVaR: it increases systemic 
risk over the whole period, while mitigates risk during the Great Financial Depression.  
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the nature and the main 
features of the shadow banking system and its relationship with the systemic risk literature. Section 
3 introduces the methodology and the data used in our analysis. Section 4 reports the main 
empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.   
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2. The contribution of MMFs to systemic risk 
2.1 Shadow banking entities and systemic risk 
One of the main challenges of recent financial literature on the topic has consisted in the 
identification of shadow banking activities and of features that banks do not have.  
Even if “shadow banks are easier to define by what they are not than by what they are” (The 
Economist, Special Report International Banking, May 10th 2014), recent banking and financial 
literature provides different definitions of shadow banking. McCulley (2007) introduces the notion 
of shadow banking as an unregulated financial institution characterized by high leverage without to 
benefit from a safety net or other official guarantees.  According to Adrian and Ashcraft (2016), the 
shadow banking system is a web of specialized financial institutions that conduit funding from 
savers to investors through a range of securization and secured funding techniques, while Claessens 
and Ratnovski (2014) define shadow banking as all financial activities, except traditional banking, 
requiring a private or public backstop to operate. For Mehrling et al. (2013) shadow banking is 
simply money market funding of capital market lending, sometimes on the balance sheets of entities 
called banks and sometimes on their balance sheets. Moreover, the Financial Stability Board (2011) 
defines the shadow banking system as the system of credit intermediation that involves entities and 
activities outside the regular banking system. In addition, revealing its prejudice about the role of 
shadow banking in financial turmoil, it states that shadow banking encompasses all financial 
activities and entities that increased systemic risk owing to maturity/liquidity transformation and/or 
leverage and/or showing indications of regulatory arbitrage as well.  
This issue has been developed by the Poszar’s (2008) and Poszar et al. (2012), providing a 
classification of the different natures and features of shadow banking entities. The authors define 
shadow banking as a chain of financial intermediaries that conduct credit intermediation, 
decomposing the same credit intermediation “into a chain of wholesale-funded, securitization-based 
lending” and defining seven steps of shadow bank credit intermediation. Moreover, Pozsar et al. 
(2012) identifies for different kind of shadow banking. The first is defined as internal shadow 
banking and consists of activities that are conducted by subsidiaries of banking holding. Hence 
these activities are included in the traditional banking’s structure. For instance, a banking holding 
company may own wealth management unit or may provide liquidity to entities belonging to 
shadow banking system. Moreover, in many cases the largest non-bank subsidiaries of banking 
groups are finance companies, broker-dealers and wealth management unit, such as mutual funds, 
hedge fund and money market funds. For these reasons, the authors stress that the shadow banking 
system is organized around securitization and wholesale funding. The second category, 
denominated as external shadow banking, consists of independent and regulated institutions that 
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conduct shadow banking activities, but these do not represent their primary business. They refer to 
stand-alone broker-dealers, independent wealth management institutions, credit hedge funds and 
finance companies, like auto loan subsidiaries. The third category, defined as independent shadow 
banking, consists of entities which are specialized only in shadow banking, such as structured 
investment vehicle, stand-alone money market funds, independent collateralized debt obligation, 
collateralized debt obligation and the majority of asset backed securities. The fourth group, defined 
as government sponsored shadow banking, includes government-sponsored enterprises, such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the United States (see also the European Commission 2012). 
These four categories are partially overlapping because, for example, a money market fund may 
be ascribed to the first typology as a subsidiary of a banking holding, or to the third one, being an 
independent entity, potentially listed, and involved in shadow banking activity.  
From the overview of the definitions of shadow banking, an important issue clearly emerges. In 
comparison with the traditional banking system, shadow banking would transform risk and 
maturities (Diamond and Dybvig 1983) without the presence of direct and explicit public sources of 
liquidity and of any sort of public deposit insurance (Adrian and Ashcraft 2016). This fact 
suggested that shadow banking is intrinsically fragile (Pozsar et al. 2012), and is at the basis of the 
exploratory researches analysing the relationship with systemic risk, as in Duca (2015), stressing 
the role of reserve and other regulatory requirements that induced shifts from bank loans to other 
sources of finance, boosting shadow banking activity in the past decade. 
 
2.2 Money Market Funds and their contribution to Systemic Risk 
The financial literature highlights, within the shadow banking sector, the wholesale funding 
channel as one of the potential device triggering systemic risk (Paltalidis et al. 2015). For this 
reasons, Poschmann (2012) focuses on mutual funds, money market funds, hedge funds and finance 
companies like consumer and commercial finance companies, leasing companies and factors or 
captive financing subsidiaries of non-financial corporations like auto or equipment lease financing 
related. The main mission of these companies is to provide loans to consumers and businesses; 
therefore, they are important suppliers of credit. Finance companies do not take deposits from 
public as funding source, but they issue commercial paper and other short and medium term debt 
instruments in order to raise funds. The increasing relevance of the above mentioned typologies of 
shadow banking entities is witnessed by Jackson (2013) who highlights that in Europe many small 
and medium enterprises are principally financed by leasing and factoring companies rather than 
traditional banks. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the above described typologies of shadow 
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banking entities, involved in a revised form of transforming risk and maturities, may be ascribed as 
financial devices potentially increasing systemic risk of the financial sectors. 
We focus our attention on continuously listed money market funds, being a part of “external and 
independent” listed shadow banking entities: they are linked with the systemic risk issue and it is 
possible to obtain reliable data of corporate variables both in accounting and financial measures.  
The main aim of this study is to test whether money market funds have contributed to increase 
systemic risk or to decrease systemic risk. The theoretical argument follows Hsu and Moroz (2010), 
suggesting that the liquidity mismatch does not necessarily imply that the assets have longer term 
than liabilities. For example, a money market fund can be compelled to a fire sale of assets, because 
of a request of an immediate liability redemption. In other words, money market funds do not have 
any problems connected with the existence of a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, 
because they do not have liabilities as the commercial banks financing the assets, but investors’ 
shares. Conversely money market funds may experience an issue linked with liquidity mismatch in 
periods of financial crisis, because they could not have an immediate cash availability to tune the 
request of an investors’ shares redemption with the sale of assets on the market. Therefore, while 
their liquidity mismatch can generally add to systemic risk in ordinary conditions, a reverse effect is 
likely to be observed in periods of crisis, such as during the recent Great Financial Depression.  
We can formalize our expectation as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher is the liquidity mismatch of a MMF, the higher will be the 
contribution to systemic risk. 
Hypothesis 2: During a financial crisis, the higher is the liquidity mismatch of a MMF, the 
lower will be the contribution to systemic risk. 
  
 
2. Methodology and Data 
Our paper makes use of the CoVaR measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). The most 
common measure of risk used by financial institutions is the value-at-risk (VaR), which focuses on 
the risk of an individual institution in isolation. The q%-VaR is the maximum dollar loss within the 
q%-confidence interval. Formally, the q-VaR for an institution i can be defined as: 
          
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝑞𝑞%                                  (1) 
7 
 
        
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is the variable of institution i for which the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
𝑖𝑖 is defined that  we set 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  to be the 
growth rates of market-valued total financial assets.  Note that 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 is typically a negative number 
and, while in practice the sign is often switched, we will not follow this convention, in accordance 
to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). 
The indicator of systemic risk, 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉, is defined as the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 of the financial system as a whole 
conditional on some event C(Xi) of institution i. That is, 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝐶𝐶(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) is defined by the q-th 
quantile of the conditional probability distribution: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝐶𝐶(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) ≤ (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝐶𝐶(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)) = 𝑞𝑞%                                     (2) 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is the market-valued asset return of institution i, and 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the return of the portfolio, 
computed as the average of the 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖’s weighted by the lagged market value assets of the institutions 
in the portfolio. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) measure the contribution of each single institution 
to systemic risk by the ΔCoVaR, namely the difference between CoVaR conditional on the 
institution being in distress and CoVaR in the median state of the institution. 
As far as the estimation method is concerned, quantile regressions are employed to estimate 
CoVaR. First, one can estimate the predicted value of a quantile regression where the financial 
sector losses 𝑋𝑋𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is determined given the losses of a particular institution i for the q%-
quantile: 
 
𝑋𝑋�𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖                                                                                                  (3) 
where 𝑋𝑋�𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 denotes the predicted value for a particular q%-quantile of the system conditional 
on a return realization 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 of institution i. From the definition of VaR, in equation (1), we have that: 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋�𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖            (4) 
In practice, the predicted value from the quantile regression of the system losses on institution i 
losses gives the value at risk of the financial system conditional on 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, because the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is 
simply the conditional quantile. Using the particular predicted value of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  yields the 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖  measure. More formally, within the quantile regression framework, the 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  measure 
is: 
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𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖=𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖                     (5) 
 
The Δ𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  is therefore given by: 
 
Δ𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉50𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝛽𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 (𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉50𝑖𝑖 )                   (6) 
In order to simplify the notation, in what follows q is always set to be 5%, so that CoVaRi  
identifies the system losses predicted on the 5% loss of institution i, while ΔCoVaRi   identifies the 
deterioration in the system losses, when the institution i moves from its median state to its 5% worst 
scenario. 
These measures are defined as time-varying, and in practice, in order to estimate the time-
varying VaRt¸ as in equation (3) and CoVaRt,, as in equation (5), we include a set of state variables 
to capture the time variation in conditional moments of asset returns. With references to these 
specific market’s factors, we also follow the implementation adopted by Lopez-Espinosa et al. 
(2012) to take into account the peculiarities of the European institutional environment. In practice, 
in our analysis we use the following variables: 
1. FTSE-Vol: is the weekly price of the index of the FTSE 100 as a volatility index; ii)  
2. Liquidity Spread: is the liquidity spread calculated as the difference between the three months 
UK repo rate and the three months UK T bill; 
3. T-bill change: indicates the change in UK T bill 3-month rate; 
4. Y-Curve slope: indicates the change in slope of the yield curve represented by UK 5-year 
minus three-months interest rate on government bonds; 
5. Credit spread: indicates the change in credit spread represented by the difference between 
BBB corporate bonds and the ten year German government bonds; 
6. Equity Return: indicates the weekly equity returns from the FTSE 100. 
 
Our analysis is performed on a sample of 143 British MMF continuously listed between 
2005Q4 and 2013Q4, thus covering the Subprime Crisis and the Great Financial Depression. Table 
1 shows the total market capitalization of the sample. Over the period 2005Q4-2013Q4, money 
market funds represent an average capitalization of roughly 76% of listed shadow banking entities 
in the United Kingdom, being the remaining part constituted by finance companies. In terms of 
capitalization the whole sector was severely hit between 2007 and 2009 by the Great Financial 
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Depression, registering in 2011 the recovery of 2007’s market capitalization and a further 
significant increase since then. 
 
[INSERT HERE TABLE 1] 
 
Table 2 reports the mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation values of 95%-
risk measures, computed for 143 entities on weekly data for the period 2005Q4-2013Q4 and 
financial market losses X(i). Indicating with 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 the market value of a money market fund and 
with 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 the ratio between total assets and common equity, we can define: 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖×𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 ×𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 ×𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖           (7) 
 
where the sum of all the 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 of the sample gives𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, namely the growth rate of the market value 
of the total asset of financial sector under analysis. The values of VaR are obtained by performing 
the quantile regressions (95%) of weekly lagged returns of market variables and computing the 
expected value of the regression. The CoVaR is the expected value of the quantile regression (95%) 
of the capital losses of the financial system on the financial losses of the individual institution and 
delayed market variables. The ΔCoVaR is the difference between the CoVaR with a quantile 
regression to 95% and that to 50%. 
Table 2 shows that money market funds of our sample went through some turbulent period. 
Indeed, during 2005Q4 and 2013Q4, the VaR was almost equal to -2% (on average), while the 
CoVaR and ∆CoVaR were equal to -2.1% and -2%, respectively. However, whenever we observe 
the values of the same quantities for the European traditional banking (Bellavite Pellegrini et al. 
2015), we find a different picture: i.e the VaR is equal to -9% (on average), CoVaR equal to -5.2% 
(on average) and a ∆CoVaR equal to -3.6%, which are considerably larger values than those found 
for the UK money market funds. 
 
[INSERT HERE TABLE 2] 
 
Once estimated the ΔCoVaR, our analysis implies the identification of the institutional 
determinants correlated. For the U.K. money market funds, we take into analysis the corporate 
variables as described by Adrian and Brunnermaier (2016) and by Lopez Espinosa et al. (2012) and 
adapt them to the money market funds specificities. For this mentioned reason we take into 
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consideration a modified variable of maturity mismatch and we define it as “liquidity mismatch”, as 
mentioned above, according to (Hsu and Moroz 2010; Poschmann 2012), as an effective main 
potential source of systemic risk. 
 
1. Leverage indicates the leverage calculated as the total assets to equity ratio of the money 
market fund i at quarter (t-1); 
2.  Liquidity Mismatch indicates the relative level of short term funding as the total short term 
debt minus cash to total liabilities ratio of money market fund i at quarter (t-1); 
3. ERV indicates the equity return volatility; 
4. Beta is the equity market beta ; 
5. M-t-B is the market to book ratio of money market fund i at quarter (t-1); 
6. Size represents the total assets of money market fund i at quarter (t-1). 
 
 In Table 3, we report the descriptive statistics both for the institutional variables and for the 
state variables to capture the time variation in conditional moments of asset returns. If we compare 
the values with those of the UK traditional banking system (as reported in Bellavite Pellegrini et al. 
2014), we notice that the average value of leverage, 1.54, is more than ten times lower than the 
traditional banking system one of 22.34, while the liquidity mismatch experiences a negative value 
of -3.70 which may be only partially compared with the maturity mismatch for the traditional 
banking system which shows a value of 7.17. Only a slight difference arises regarding the market to 
book value being 0.94 for money market funds as compared to 1.01 for the traditional UK banking 
system, while the beta coefficient in the traditional banking system is 1.26, which is more than 
double than in our money market funds of 0.56. 
 
[INSERT HERE TABLE 3] 
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
We estimate a panel predictive regression model with fixed effects, where the full 
specification can be described as follows: 
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1  +                         𝛽𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1+𝛽𝛽8𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐1𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2 +                        ∑  𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−1𝑘𝑘=1             (8) 
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Table 4 reports the results of several estimated equations, where the specification described 
above has been simplified according to the following rules. Column (1) represents our baseline 
specification considering the full sample period, without crisis and time dummies. In column (2), 
we report the regression containing time dummies. Specification (3) considers crisis dummies:  in 
particular, the dummy variable Crisis 1 captures the characteristics of the Subprime Crisis, 
containing period between the outbreak of subprime loans crisis in 2007Q3 and the outbreak of 
crisis in  2008Q3; the dummy variable Crisis 2 captures the effects of the Global Financial Crisis 
running since 2008Q4 (the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers) to 2010Q2.  
 
 
[INSERT HERE TABLE 4] 
 
Model (1) highlights that equity return volatility has a negative and statistically significant 
impact on systemic risk, meanwhile liquidity mismatch has a negative impact on systemic risk. This 
latter results confirms our Hypothesis 1. As far as the other corporate variables are concerned, 
money market funds’ beta and market to book value are likely to mitigate systemic risk. Model (2) 
confirms former finding when controlling for time-specific effects. Model (3) documents a negative 
and statistically significant impact of the dummy Crisis 1 while Crisis 2 dummy has a positive 
impact. This latter finding suggests that money market funds have contributed to decrease and not 
to increase systemic risk during the Global Financial Crisis in United Kingdom, being otherwise 
their role much more detrimental during the Subprime Crisis. In broad terms, Black et al. (2013) 
document a similar result about the contribution of the British banking system to the systemic risk 
of the European ones. 
Table 5 reports the marginal effect of money market funds corporate variables over Crisis 1 and 
Crisis 2. Column (4) reports the main coefficients, while column (5) and column (6) report the 
marginal effects, i.e. the interactions between the money market funds’ corporate variables and 
Crisis 1 and Crisis 2, respectively. 
 
[INSERT HERE TABLE 5] 
 
The results listed in Column (5) show that none of the money market funds corporate variables 
was moderated by the Subprime Crisis, while Column (6) reports a positive impact of liquidity 
mismatch and beta coefficient on systemic risk during the Global Financial Crisis. This results 
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confirms our Hypothesis 2, and represent a contribution with respect to former literature, where the 
maturity mismatch is identified as negatively related to risk, especially in a context of crisis. Indeed, 
empirical evidence on traditional banking (Bellavite Pellegrini et al. 2015; Betz et al., 2016), 
suggests that the traditional banking system maturity mismatch represents a proxy of 
interconnectedness among financial institutions, being extremely beneficial in normal times and 
very detrimental during the financial turmoil. As far as the shadow entities are concerned, Hsu and 
Moroz (2010) stress that money market funds liquidity mismatch has not too much to share with 
traditional banks maturity mismatch, because it does not imply that assets have a longer average 
duration than liabilities. A money market funds has to sell off its assets whenever none of the 
liabilities can be rolled over.  
The different results that we report with respect to MMFs may be interpreted according to the 
different institutional features of liquidity mismatch for money market funds and for maturity 
mismatch in the traditional banking system. In this respect, Table 2 shows how the average value of 
liquidity mismatch for money market funds is negative and how these entities are featured by a low 
level of leverage. If we combine these two pieces evidence, it emerges that money market funds are 
characterized by the existence of a potentially satisfying level of liquidity. For money market funds, 
this corporate variable is likely to represent a proxy of liquidity endowment which is useful in 
lowering systemic risk during the financial turmoil. Similar evidence occurs for the beta coefficient 
being likely to respectively decrease systemic risk in the Great Financial Depression for money 
market funds and to increase for traditional banks. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper evaluated the impact of the corporate variables of 143 continuously listed money 
market funds, a considerable part of shadow banking entities, on systemic risk in United Kingdom 
over the period 2005Q4-2013Q4 covering both the Subprime Crisis and the Great Financial 
Depression. Corporate and financial descriptive statistics suggest that UK money market funds are 
featured by an average value of leverage more than ten times lower as compared with traditional 
UK banks, as well as by a negative average value for the liquidity mismatch. An important result of 
our study is related to the different impact of liquidity mismatch on systemic risk on the whole 
period and during the Global Financial Crisis, being first negative (implying increasing systemic 
risk) and the second positive (decreasing systemic risk). As comparison, the results for the 
European traditional banking system reported by Bellavite Pellegrini, et al. (2015) show that 
maturity mismatch have an opposite impact. In this respect, UK listed money market funds are 
likely to have decreased rather than increased systemic risk during the Global Financial Crisis. 
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These results are confirmed when we introduce in our specification two Crisis dummies, 
documenting a negative impact during the Subprime Crisis and a positive impact during the Global 
Financial Crisis. Most likely this finding depends on the different endowment of liquidity of these 
entities had in comparison with traditional banks. 
It will be interesting to extend this research to other shadow banking entities, such as finance 
companies for instance, also considering other European countries, in particular continental Europe. 
We leave this development to future research. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Market capitalization for the full sample of money market funds (mln £). The table 
reports the average market capitalization, calculated year by year, for the sample of 143 money 
market funds continuously listed in the UK over  the period 2005Q4-2013Q4. 
Capitalization/Years 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Money market funds 30,263.00 41,275.90 29,272.29 39,291.51 46,448.25 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics. The table reports the average and median values, and the standard 
deviation of the corporate variables, for the sample of 143 money market funds continuously listed 
in the UK between 2005Q4 and 2013Q4, and of the variables used to estimate the ∆CoVaR, 
calculated over the period 2005Q4-2013Q4. 
 
  
 Average Median Standard Deviation 
 
Leverage 1.547 1.101 6.679  
Liquidity Mismatch -3.704 -0.104 32.768  
ERV 0.013 0.011 0.007  
Beta 0.568 0.577 0.353  
M-t-B 0.948 0.900 0.906  
Size (mln£) 212.439 184.427 109.737  
FTSE-Vol 0.012 0.010 0.006  
Liquidity Spread 0.086 0.073 0.070  
T-Bill Change -0.010 -0.002 0.049  
Credit Spread 2.687 2.714 0.555  
Y-Curve Slope 0.005 0.003 0.034  
Equity Return 0.009 0.026 0.076  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for X(i), VaR, CoVaR and ∆CoVaR. The table reports average, 
median, min and max values, standard deviation, for the growth rate in market value of the total 
asset (X(i)), for the Value at Risk (VaR), for the CoVaR and the ∆CoVaR measures, calculated for 
the 143 money market funds listed in UK over the period 2005Q4-2013Q4. 
 
 
  
 
  
 Average Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
X(i) 0.00173 0.00116 -32.242 61.409 0.2878 
VaR -0.0173 -0.0103 -32.242 12.662 0.1379 
CoVaR -0.0213 -0.02145 -0.2663 0.4236 0.0157 
∆CoVaR -0.0196 -0.0185 -0.2304 0.39123 0.01540 
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Table 4. Regression Analysis of ∆Covar Determinants. The table reports the results of Fixed 
Effects Panel Model regressions for the ∆Covar of 143 UK money market funds over the period 
2005Q4-2013Q4.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent the statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
∆CoVaR (-1) 0.673*** 0.692*** 0.678*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
VaR (-1) 0.014 0.013 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Leverage (-1) -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Liquidity Mismatch (-1) -0.004** -0.002 -0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ERV (-1) -1.729*** -0.346 -1.678*** 
 (0.281) (0.222) (0.310) 
Beta (-1) 0.015** 0.015** 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
M-to-B (-1) 0.009** 0.006* 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Size (-1) 0.002 0.002 0.020 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
Crisis 1   -0.022***  
   (0.003)  
Crisis 2   0.006*  
   (0.004)  
Constant -0.065 -0.037 -0.154** 
 (0.071) (0.058) (0.067) 
    
Time dummies No Yes No 
    
Observations 4,719 4,719 4,719 
R-squared 0.550 0.611 0.557 
Number of id 143 143 143 
AIC -11740 -12337 -11814 
BIC -11689 -12087 -11750 
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Table 5. Regression Analysis of ∆Covar Determinants (Marginal effects for money market funds 
over the financial crisis). The table reports the results of a Fixed Effects Panel Model regression for 
the ∆Covar of the 143 UK money market funds over the period 2005Q4-2013Q4. Column (4) 
reports the baseline coefficients, Column (5)  the coefficients of the variables interacted with Crisis 
1, and Column (6) the coefficients of the variables interacted with Crisis 2. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Baseline coefficients 
Marginal 
effects over 
Crisis 1 
Marginal 
effects over 
Crisis 2 
    
∆CoVaR (-1) 0.666*** 0.095*** 0.000 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.024) 
VaR (-1) -0.008 0.003 0.035** 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.016) 
Leverage (-1) -0.002** -0.005 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) 
Liquidity Mismatch (-1) -0.006*** 0.013 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.027) (0.004) 
ERV (-1) -1.687*** -0.757 -0.050 
 (0.355) (0.550) (0.501) 
Beta (-1) 0.009 0.019 0.022* 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) 
M-to-B (-1) 0.017** -0.005 -0.024 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) 
Size (-1) 0.020 0.004 -0.007 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) 
Crisis 1 -0.015   
 (0.033)   
Crisis 2 0.054   
 (0.040)   
Constant -0.060*   
 (0.036)   
    
Observations 4,719 
R-squared 0.562 
Number of id 143 
AIC -11828 
BIC -11662 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Average and median values of balance sheet variables by year (mln £). The table 
reports the average and median values of some balance sheet values, calculated year by year for  the 
sample of 143 money market funds listed in UK over the period  2005Q4-2013Q4. 
 
  
 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Total Asset  
Average 268.33 353.81 259.12 338.00 398.16 
Median 143.42 177.80 126.17 180.05 202.81 
Common Equity  
Average 235.29 317.52 227.16 299.32 355.81 
Median 114.07 158.08 114.07 158.84 175.35 
Short Term Debt  
Average 6.92 10.23 7.34 13.33 15.59 
Median 0.05 1.41 - 0.37 4.15 
Cash&Equivalent  
Average 11.20 14.65 16.38 15.31 17.37 
Median 3.03 2.90 3.93 3.45 3.10 
Total Liabilities  
Average 31.72 35.03 30.68 38.60 42.20 
Median 12.76 12.70 9.42 11.29 14.66 
